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In recent years there has been a growing concern with the fragility of the
financial system. Increasing defaults on junk bonds and the stock market crash
of October 1987 have raised the specter of major financial crises which might
inflict severe damage on the economy. Policymakers, particularly those in the
central bank, are faced with the questions of what they should do to prevent
financial crises and what their response should be when a financial crises ap-
pears imminent. In order to start providing intelligent answers to these ques-
tions, we must first understand the nature of financial crises and how they
might affect the aggregate economy.
This paper seeks to understand the nature of financial crises by examining
their history in the United States using the new and burgeoning literature on
asymmetric information and financial structure, which has been excellently
surveyed recently by Gertler (1988a). After describing how an asymmetric
information approach helps to understand the nature of financial crises, the
paper focuses on a historical examination of a series of financial crises in the
United States, beginning with the panic of 1857 and ending with the stock
market crash of 19 October 1987. The asymmetric information approach ac-
counts for patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are
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otherwise hard to explain. It also suggests why financial crises have had such
important consequences for the aggregate economy over the past one hundred
and fifty years.
3.1 The Nature of Financial Crises
There are two polar views of the nature of financial crises in the literature.
Monetarists beginning with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have associated
financial crises with banking panics. They stress the importance of banking
panics because they view them as a major source of contractions in the money
supply which, in turn, had led to severe contractions in aggregate economic
activity in the United States. Their view of financial crisis leads monetarists
to advocate a lender-of-last-resort role for the central bank, so that banking
panics and the subsequent monetary instability will be prevented. Events in
which there is a sharp drop in wealth but no potential for a banking panic and
a resulting sharp decline in the money supply are not seen by monetarists as
real financial crises that require any central bank intervention. Indeed,
Schwartz (1986) characterizes these situations as "pseudo financial crises."
Central bank intervention in a pseudo financial crises is viewed as unneces-
sary and, indeed, possibly harmful; that is, it may lead to a decrease in eco-
nomic efficiency because firms that deserve to fail are bailed out or because it
results in excessive money growth that stimulates inflation.
An opposite view of financial crises is held by Kindleberger (1978) and
Minsky (1972), who have a much broader definition of what constitutes a real
financial crisis than monetarists. They argue that financial crises involve
either sharp declines in asset prices, failures of large financial and nonfinan-
cial firms, deflations or disinflations, disruptions in foreign exchange mar-
kets, or some combination of all of these. Since they perceive any one of these
disturbances as having potentially serious consequences for the aggregate
economy, they advocate a much-expanded role for government intervention
when a financial crisis, broadly defined, occurs.
One problem with the Kindleberger-Minsky view of financial crises is that
it does not supply a rigorous theory of what characterizes a financial crisis,
and thus lends itself to being used too broadly as a justification for government
interventions that might not be beneficial for the economy. Indeed, this is the
basis of Schwartz's (1986) attack on the Kindleberger-Minsky view. At the
other extreme, the monetarist view of financial crises is overly narrow because
it focuses only on bank panics and their effect on the money supply. In contrast
to both these views, the recent literature on asymmetric information and finan-
cial structure provides a broad definition of the nature of financial crises,
while supplying a theory which does not automatically justify government
interventions when there is a sharp drop in wealth.
The asymmetric information literature which looks at the impact of finan-
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available to different parties in a financial contract. Borrowers have an infor-
mational advantage over lenders because borrowers know more about the in-
vestment projects they want to undertake. This informational advantage re-
sults in adverse selection and the classic "lemons" problem first described by
Akerlof (1970). A lemons problem occurs in the debt market because lenders
have trouble determining whether a borrower is a good risk (he has good in-
vestment opportunities with low risk) or, alternatively, is a bad risk (he has
poorer investment projects with high risk). If the lender cannot distinguish
between the borrowers of good quality and bad quality (the lemons), he will
only make the loan at an interest rate that reflects the average quality of the
good and bad borrowers. The result is that high-quality borrowers will be
paying a higher interest rate than they should because low-quality borrowers
pay a lower interest rate than they should. One result of this lemons problem
is that some high-quality borrowers may drop out of the market, with what
would have been profitable investment projects not being undertaken.
1
Another result, as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), is that infor-
mation asymmetry can result in credit rationing in which some borrowers are
arbitrarily denied loans. This occurs because a higher interest rate leads to
even greater adverse selection: the borrowers with the riskiest investment
projects will now be the likeliest to want to take out loans at the higher interest
rate. If the lender cannot identify the borrowers with the riskier investment
projects, he may want to cut down the number of loans he makes, which
causes the supply of loans to decrease rather than increase with the higher
interest rate.
2 Thus, even if there is an excess demand for loans, a higher
interest rate will not equilibrate the market because additional increases in the
interest rate will only decrease the supply of loans and worsen the excess
demand for loans even further. Indeed, as Mankiw (1986) has demonstrated,
a small rise in the riskless interest rate can lead to a very large decrease in
lending and possibly even a collapse in the market.
The adverse selection-lemons analysis above indicates how a disruption
can occur in financial markets that adversely affects aggregate economic activ-
ity. If market interest rates are driven up sufficiently because of increased de-
mand for credit or because of a decline in the money supply, the adverse selec-
tion problem might dramatically worsen and there will be a significant decline
in lending, which, in turn, results in a substantial decrease in investment and
aggregate economic activity. In addition, if uncertainty increases in a financial
market such that it becomes harder for lenders to screen out good borrowers
from bad borrowers, the adverse selection problem would also increase dra-
matically and, again, could lead to a sharp decline in investment and aggre-
gate activity.
These mechanisms suggest that an important manifestation of a financial
crisis would be a large rise in interest rates to borrowers for whom there is
substantial difficulty in obtaining reliable information about their characteris-
tics; that is, for whom there is a serious asymmetric information problem. At72 Frederic S. Mishkin
the same time, there would be a much smaller effect on interest rates to bor-
rowers for whom almost no asymmetric information problem exists because
information about their characteristics is easily obtainable. Since low-quality
borrowers are more likely to be those firms for which information about their
characteristics is difficult to obtain, while high-quality borrowers are more
likely to be ones for which the asymmetric information problem is least se-
vere, a rise in the spread between interest rates on low-quality versus high-
quality bonds can provide information on when the adverse selection problem
becomes more severe in debt markets.
One way that lenders can reduce the adverse selection problem in debt mar-
kets is to have the borrower provide collateral for the loan. Thus, if the bor-
rower defaults on the loan, the lender can take title to the collateral and sell it
to make up the loss. Note that if the collateral is of good enough quality, then
it is no longer as important whether the borrower is of good or bad quality
since the loss incurred by the lender if the loan is defaulted on is substantially
reduced. With collateral, therefore, the fact that there is asymmetric informa-
tion between the borrower and lender is no longer as important a factor in the
market.
The importance of collateral for reducing the adverse selection problem in
debt markets suggests another mechanism whereby financial disruption ad-
versely affects aggregate economic activity. As emphasized by Calomiris and
Hubbard (1990) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988), a sharp decrease in the
valuation of firms' assets in a stock market crash lowers the value of collateral
and thereby makes adverse selection a more important problem for lenders
since the losses from loan defaults are now higher. Note that this decline in
asset values could occur either because of expectations of lower future income
streams from these assets or because of a rise in market interest rates which
lowers the present discounted value of future income streams. The lemons
problem analysis indicates that the increased importance of adverse selection
will lead to a decline in lending and, therefore, a decline in investment and
aggregate economic activity. Again, we would expect that this increase in the
adverse selection problem would affect interest rates for lower-quality firms
more than for higher-quality firms, about whose characteristics there is better
information. Hence, the problem would be manifested by an increase in the
interest-rate spread for high- versus low-quality borrowers.
Asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders also results in a
moral hazard problem which affects the efficiency of financial markets. Be-
cause leaders have trouble ascertaining the quality of investment projects that
borrowers wish to undertake, the borrower has incentives to engage in activi-
ties that may be personally beneficial but will increase the probability of de-
fault and thus harm the lender. For example, the borrower has incentives to
cheat by misallocating funds for his own personal use, either through embez-
zlement or by spending on perquisites which do not lead to increased profits.
3
Also the borrower has incentives to undertake investment in unprofitable proj-73 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
ects that increase his power or stature or to invest in projects with higher risk,
in which the borrower does well if the project succeeds but the lender bears
most of the loss if the project fails. In addition, the borrower has incentives to
shirk and to just not work very hard. The conflict of interest between the
borrower and lender (the agency problem) implies that lending and investment
will be at suboptimal levels. Indeed, as indicated by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), a lower amount of a borrower's net worth increases the agency prob-
lem because the borrower has less to lose by engaging in moral hazard.
Hence, a decline in borrowers' net worth leads to a decrease in lending, and
thus a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity.
The agency and adverse-selection problems provide additional mechanisms
for financial crises to affect the aggregate economy. An unanticipated deflation
or a disinflation redistributes wealth from debtors to creditors by increasing
the real value of debt, and thereby reducing borrowers' net worth. The result-
ing increase in adverse selection and agency problems causes a decline in
investment and economic activity.
4 The presence of asymmetric information
thus provides a rationale for Irving Fisher's (1933) debt-deflation analysis of
depressions which points to a decreasing price level and increased real indebt-
edness as a major source of the economic contraction during the Great Depres-
sion. In a multiperiod context, Gertler (1988b) shows that the concept of a
borrower's net worth can be broadened to include the discounted value of
future profits. Thus a stock market crash which represents a decreased valua-
tion of firms' discounted future profits also increases adverse selection and
agency problems and can lead to a decline in investment and a business-cycle
contraction.
Firms with high net worth and a high value of discounted future profits—
that is, high-quality firms—are much less likely to have greatly increased
agency costs (costs due to asymmetric information in the market) when a
stock market crash or a deflationary shock occurs, than low-quality firms with
low net worth and a low value of discounted future profits. An increase in
agency costs stemming from either disinflation or a stock market crash, there-
fore, should also be reflected in a rise in the interest-rate spread for high-
versus low-quality borrowers.
An important feature of the recent literature on asymmetric information and
financial structure is that it suggests why banks play a prominent role in finan-
cial markets. Banks are eminently well suited to solve many of the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems inherent in credit markets. They have
expertise in collecting information about firms, and thus are better able to
screen good borrowers from bad borrowers at a low cost. This is especially
true because they are not as subject to the free-rider problem which exists for
individual purchasers of marketable securities who can costlessly take advan-
tage of information that other purchasers of marketable securities produce.
The advantages of banks in information-collection activities are also enhanced
by their ability to engage in long-term customer relationships and to issue74 Frederic S. Mishkin
loans using lines-of-credit arrangements. In addition, they can engage in
lower-cost monitoring than individuals, as is demonstrated in Diamond
(1984), and have advantages in enforcement of restrictive covenants, both of
which reduce the potential for moral hazard by borrowers.
5 The existence of
asymmetric information in credit markets provides a compelling rationale for
the importance of banks in getting funds from savers to borrowers who have
the most attractive investment opportunities, thereby enhancing economic ef-
ficiency.
The importance of asymmetric information provides another mechanism by
which financial crises reduce economic activity. The analysis above indicates
that banks perform an important role in generating productive investment for
the economy. Thus, as is described in Bernanke (1983), disturbances in finan-
cial markets that reduce the amount of financial intermediation that can be
undertaken by banks will lead to a reduction in lending to borrowers with
profitable investment opportunities, resulting in a contraction of economic
activity.
Bank panics are clearly one major way for banks to find themselves unable
to fully perform their intermediation role.
6 In a panic, depositors, fearing the
safety of their deposits, withdraw them from the banking system, causing a
contraction in loans and a multiple contraction in deposits. Here, again, an
asymmetric information problem is at the source of the financial crisis because
depositors rush to make withdrawals from solvent as well as insolvent banks
since they cannot distinguish between them. Furthermore, banks' desire to
protect themselves from possible deposit outflows leads them to increase their
reserves relative to deposits, which also produces a contraction in loans and
deposits. The net result is that a bank panic reduces the funds available to
banks to make loans, and thus the cost of financial intermediation rises, caus-
ing a reduction in investment and a decline in aggregate economic activity.
A bank panic also has the feature of decreasing liquidity, which will lead to
higher interest rates. As we have seen before, the rise in interest rates directly
increases adverse selection problems in credit markets and can reduce the
value of firms' net worth, which also increases adverse selection as well as
agency problems. Thus, since bank panics have the secondary effect of in-
creasing adverse selection and agency problems in financial markets, they
lead to economic contraction through these channels as well. We should then
expect to see that bank panics are also associated with a larger interest-rate
spread between higher- and lower-quality debt instruments.
The monetarist literature on the role of bank panics in economic contrac-
tions offers an additional channel by which financial crises affect the aggregate
economy. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) document how bank panics in the
United States led to sharp contractions in the money supply as a result of
depositors' movement out of deposits into currency and banks' movement out
of loans into reserves. These contractions in the money supply are then seen
as being responsible for substantial declines in economic activity and the price
level.75 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
The recent literature on the impact of asymmetric information on aggregate
economic activity provides a view complementary to that of the monetarists
on the importance of bank panics. Indeed, the asymmetric information ap-
proach supplies a transmission mechanism for a decline in the money supply
to lead to a decline in aggregate economic activity. The deflation that stems
from a decline in the money supply increases adverse selection and agency
problems, which then cause a decline in investment and aggregate economic
activity. However, the asymmetric information approach suggests that a de-
cline in the money supply as a result of a financial crisis is not the whole story
of why financial crises affect the aggregate economy. Instead, it takes a much
broader view of what a financial crisis is and puts a very different light on
when a financial crisis is real rather than a pseudo crisis.
3.2 A Historical Analysis of Pre-World War II Financial Crises
To obtain evidence on how we should characterize financial crises, I exam-
ine a series of episodes in the 1857-1941 period in which it is generally agreed
that financial crises occurred. Then in section 3.3, I examine two postwar
episodes in which there was Federal Reserve intervention to prevent a finan-
cial crisis. The analysis in the previous section suggests that a critical variable
for assessing the nature of a particular financial crisis is the spread between
interest rates for high- and low-quality borrowers. For the period beginning in
1919, the analysis uses the spread between Moody's Baa corporate bond rate
and the long-term Treasury bond rate averaged over the month, the same
spread variable used by Bernanke (1983). However, since this series is not
available prior to 1919, an alternative measure must be used before that date.
Macaulay (1938) provides monthly yield data for high-grade railroad bonds
from 1857 to 1935 which are essentially averages over the month—they are
calculated from the average of the high and low bond price for that month.
The spread measure was constructed from this data by subtracting the average
yield on the best one-fourth of the bonds from the average yield on the worst
one-fourth of the bonds (i.e., three bonds in the best and worst categories
were used for 1857-66, five bonds for 1867-81, eight bonds for 1882-87,
and ten bonds for 1888-1935).
7 One-fourth as the fraction of bonds in the best
and worst categories were chosen because this fraction led to the highest cor-
relation of the Macaulay spread variable with the Bernanke spread variable in
the 1919-35 period, when the two series overlap. However, the choice of the
fraction of bonds to include in each category is not crucial. The correlation
coefficient between Macaulay spread variables using a different choice for the
number of bonds in each category is always above .95 in the 1857-1918 pe-
riod, and the conclusions for each episode studied are not affected by a differ-
ent choice for the number of bonds in each category.
The Macaulay spread variable has several problems in comparison with the
Bernanke spread variable. First, there is no guarantee using the Macaulay
variable that the worst or the best bonds remain in the same rating class76 Frederic S. Mishkin
throughout the time period studied. This cannot be helped because ratings for
these bonds are not available. It should be noted that the Bernanke spread
variable is not perfect on these grounds either, because, as Temin (1976)
points out, during periods when default risk was changing rapidly, it is not
clear that the Moody's ratings continued to have the same meaning. Another
potential problem is that the Macaulay bonds are all of fairly high grade: for
the 1919-35 period, the worst Macaulay bond still has an interest rate below
the Moody's Baa corporate bond rate, while the best bond has a rate below the
Aaa corporate bond rate. There is a possibility that the Macaulay bonds might
not have a sufficient difference in their grades to pick up the changes in the
interest rates for high- and low-quality borrowers.
Despite these limitations, the Macaulay measure seems to perform well.
The Macaulay spread variable, denoted as SPREADM, is plotted for 1857-1918
in figure 3.1, panel A. Panel B plots the Bernanke spread variable, SPREADB,
over the 1919-88 period along with the Macaulay variable from 1919 to 1935.
As is evident in panel B, the Macaulay variable is highly correlated with the
Bernanke variable: the correlation coefficient between the two variables dur-
ing 1919-35 is 0.88. Both variables tell similar stories in that period—they
rise during the 1920-21 recession, decline thereafter to a low point in the late
twenties, climb dramatically with the onset of the banking panics in late 1930,
and then fall to substantially lower levels by the end of 1935. Furthermore, as
we will see, the Macaulay spread variable seems to have a consistent relation-
ship with stock market and commercial-paper-rate variables in the pre-1919
episodes studied below, adding further confidence in its validity.
The analysis of the nature of financial crises in the previous section also
suggests that we should look at stock prices and interest rates when we ana-
lyze individual episodes of financial crisis. The level of stock prices, denoted
as STOCK, is constructed as the cumulative geometric sum of the stock-market-
return series from Wilson, Sylla, and Jones (1990),
8 and is thus meant to be
an end-of-month series. However, the earlier data in the stock market series
(up until the 1920s) are monthly averages or the averages of the high and low
stock prices for the month. Thus, even though the stock price series used here
is meant to be thought of as an end-of-month series, it is actually closer to a
monthly average, up until the 1920s. Furthermore, before 1890, the stock
price series is primarily from railroad stocks.
The interest rates examined are those on high-grade commercial paper, RCP,
and those on call loans to stock and bond brokers in New York, RCALL. For
1857-1918, the commercial-paper-rate series is choice 60- to 90-day, two-
name paper from Macaulay (1938), while after this date it is the rate on 4- to
6-month commercial paper obtained from Banking and Monetary Statistics,
1914-1940 and 1941-1970, published by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, and from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, various years.
The call-loan-rate series is taken from Wilson, Sylla, and Jones (1990), and
it, along with the commercial-paper-rate series, are monthly averages of daily77 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
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Fig. 3.1 Interest rate spreads
rates. In the following analysis of financial crises, more attention will be fo-
cused on the commercial paper rate when discussing interest rate movements.
This makes sense because commercial paper rates should be closer to the in-
terest rates that affect business firms' decisions to invest, while call loan rates
are influenced by peculiarities of events in the stock market.
There are clearly many other variables that we might want to examine in
order to better understand what is going on during financial crises—for ex-
ample, business failures, the price level, commodity prices, and industrial
production. However, in this paper I will be conducting a more preliminary
analysis and will only be examining financial market variables. In future
work, I hope to be able to use such data to engage in a fuller treatment of the
financial crisis phenomenon.78 Frederic S. Mishkin
Now that we understand the data we are looking at, we can turn to discus-
sion of particular episodes of financial crisis. I will focus especially on the
timing of events and financial variables during these episodes, because the
timing will enable us to distinguish between different views of the nature of
financial crises. The crises I will examine first are the pre-World War II epi-
sodes that are most prominent in discussions by Sprague (1910), Kindleberger
(1978), Bordo (1986), Gorton (1988) and Schwert (1989a).
9 Historical de-
scriptions of these episodes are found in Sprague (1910), Collman (1931),
Smith and Cole (1935), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and Sobel (1968).
3.2.1 The Panic of 1857
The stock price, interest-rate-spread, and commercial-paper-rate data for
the two-year period surrounding the panic in October 1857 are reported in
figure 3.2. Panel A plots the Macaulay interest-rate-spread variable, SPREADM,
and the stock price index, STOCK. The left-hand vertical axis corresponds to
the spread variable, while the right-hand vertical axis corresponds to the stock
price index. The stock price index is normalized to equal 100 at its peak value.
Panel B plots the commercial paper rate, RCP, and the call rate, RCALL. In both
panels, the date set by the National Bureau of Economic Research for the
beginning of the 1857-58 recession, July 1857, is marked on the horizontal
axis with an R, while the October 1857 date for the banking panic is marked
by a P. This general format is used in the figures for the other episodes dis-
cussed later.
The interest-rate-spread variable, along with the commercial paper rate, be-
gins to climb in July 1857, three months before the banking panic, while the
stock market is falling from the beginning of the year. On August 25, the Ohio
Life Insurance & Trust Company, a major financial institution with substantial
investments in western land and railroads as well as in commodity futures,
failed. This was followed by a major stock market crash in September and
October. The market returns of —14.46% in September and —15.26% in
October were the tenth and eleventh worst monthly returns tabulated by Wil-
son, Sylla, and Jones (1990) for their entire sample period of January 1834—
August 1988. With the failure of the Ohio Life & Trust Co., reserves began to
be pulled from New York, and the first bank failures there occurred in Septem-
ber. Interest rates shot through the roof, with the commercial paper rate rising
to 18% in September and a peak of 24% in October. Thinly capitalized rail-
roads, such as the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, the Fond du Lac, and
several smaller railroads, went bankrupt in September. Major runs on the New
York banks began in October, finally culminating in a suspension of specie
payments in mid October, and bank panics spread throughout the country.
Failures of major railroads, such as the Erie & Pittsburgh, the Fort Wayne &
Chicago, the Reading, and Illinois Central, occurred in October. The outcome
was a severe recession which ended in December 1858.
The timing of events in the panic of 1857 seem to fit an asymmetric infor-79 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
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Fig. 3.2 The panic of 1857
mation interpretation of the financial crisis. Rather than starting with the bank
panic in October 1857, the disturbance to the financial markets seems to arise
several months earlier with the rise in interest rates, the stock market decline,
the major failure of a financial firm, and the widening of the interest rate
spread. The asymmetric information story provides an explanation of how the
financial crisis could have led to a severe economic downturn. The rise in
interest rates and the stock market decline, along with the failure of Ohio Life
& Trust Co. which increased uncertainty, would magnify the adverse selection
and agency problems in the credit markets. Indeed, the stock market crash
might be linked to the general rise in interest rates which would have lowered
the present discounted value of future income streams. In this case, the panic
of 1857 can be viewed as a liquidity crisis. The net result from the increase in80 Frederic S. Mishkin
adverse selection and agency problems is that investment activity and aggre-
gate economic activity would decline, causing expectations of further eco-
nomic contraction and business failures.
As pointed out in Gorton (1988), depositors would now want to withdraw
their funds from the banking system, because the bleak business conditions
would lead them to expect losses on deposits left in the banks and this would
be especially undesirable at a time when their consumption might be falling
owing to the economic downturn. The outcome of the process would be a run
on the banks, and the resulting panic would raise interest rates further, cause
the stock market to decline even more, and worsen agency and adverse selec-
tion problems in the credit markets. That a severe economic contraction would
develop is a logical outcome of this process.
Finally, after suspension of specie payments, the intervention of clearing-
house associations, as noted in Gorton (1985) would help to separate solvent
from insolvent banks.
1
0 The banking panic would then subside and, with the
restoration of liquidity in the banking system, interest rates would fall, the
stock market might undergo a recovery, and, if economic uncertainty and de-
flation were not too severe, agency and adverse selection problems would
diminish, leading to a decline in the interest-rate-spread variable and setting
the stage for an eventual recovery of the economy. This scenario seems to
describe the data and the events in 1857-58 quite well.
A monetarist interpretation cannot explain these events as effectively be-
cause it does not explain the timing of the events and the financial variables,
that is, it does not explain why the banking panic occurred when it did and
why the spread between interest rates for high- and low-quality borrowers
rises dramatically before the panic and then declines after the panic subsides.
The asymmetric information story does not rule out important effects on ag-
gregate economic activity from the decline in the money supply that a banking
panic produces, it just suggests that there is more to the story of a financial
crisis than its effects on the money supply.
3.2.2 The Panic of 1873
The data for the period surrounding the banking panic of September 1873
is found in panels A and B of figure 3.3. (the format is identical to that in fig.
3.2). Compared to all of the other panics studied in this paper, the panic of
1873 is somewhat unusual. First, it occurs before the business-cycle peak, as
can be seen in figure 3.3, and second, it was apparently quite unanticipated
since it was not preceded by a rise in the interest rate spread.
The initial disturbance for the panic seems to have originated with the finan-
cial difficulties of the railroad sector. On 8 September 1873, the New York
Warehouse & Security Company, which had made substantial loans to the
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad as well on grain and produce, suspended.
This suspension was soon followed by the failure of the banking house of
Kenyon, Cox & Co. as a result of endorsements on $1.5 million of paper81 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
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Fig. 3.3 The panic of 1873
issued by the Canada Southern Railroad. At the time, neither of these failures
was considered to be of major importance, but they were followed on Septem-
ber 18 by the suspension of Jay Cooke & Co., one of the most respected and
important financial institutions in the United States, and by the suspension of
Fisk & Hatch the next day. The collapse of Jay Cooke & Co. also stemmed
from financial difficulties in the railroad sector, specifically, problems with its
loans to Northern Pacific Railroad, which Jay Cooke & Co., controlled. With
the announcement of the Jay Cooke & Co. failure, the stock market went into
a nose dive, with the result that 18 September 1873 was dubbed "Black Thurs-
day" and the decline in stock prices was over 7% in the month of September.
Immediately, runs began on the Fourth National Bank and the Union Trust
Company. By Saturday, September 20, both the Union Trust Company and the82 Frederic S. Mishkin
National Bank of the Commonwealth had failed and a major banking panic
was in full swing. On the same day the New York Stock Exchange took the
unprecedented step of closing, not to reopen until September 30. On Septem-
ber 20, the New York Clearing House began to issue clearing-house loan cer-
tificates to its member banks, and the decision to suspend specie payments
was made on September 24. Over the next several days, suspension of specie
payments spread nationwide. It was not until the end of October that banks
almost fully resumed specie payments to depositors.
In figure 3.3, panel A, we see that the spread between interest rates on high-
and low-quality borrowers jumped in the month immediately following the
banking panic and stock market crash. We also see in panel B that interest
rates began to rise one month before the crash, and thus the higher interest
rates may have been one source of increased adverse selection and agency
problems that helped cause the panic. However, the abruptness of the panic
suggests that major failures of financial firms such as Jay Cooke & Co. may
have increased informational uncertainty, depressed the value of net worth
relative to liabilities, and thereby increased adverse selection and agency
costs. The runs on banks which occurred immediately after the failure of Jay
Cooke & Co. reduced the ability of the banks to perform their intermediation
role and are another potential factor in inducing an investment decline and a
general economic contraction, which began, according to the NBER dating,
in November 1873.
Again, the process of sorting insolvent from solvent banks and insolvent
from solvent business firms after the panic would reduce informational uncer-
tainty. The decline in interest rates and the recovery of the stock market after
November 1873 would also help reduce adverse selection and agency prob-
lems. Consistent with this view, the spread variable does decline immediately
after November 1873; however, in contrast to the 1857 episode, the spread
variable begins to rise in 1874 and, for the last half of 1874 and all of 1875, is
at levels near the peak value reached in October and November of 1873. The
high values of the interest-rate spread in 1874 and 1875 are explained by the
substantial deflation that sets in after the 1873 panic. As we have seen, a sharp
deflation transfers wealth from borrowers to creditors, causing a deterioration
in business firms' net worth. The resulting increase in asymmetric informa-
tion problems, which is reflected in the rise in the interest rate spread, can
thus be a major propagation mechanism during the recession.
1
1 The recession
which began in November 1873 was especially long lived and, according to
NBER dating, did not end until March 1879. It is often considered to be one
of the more severe economic contractions in U.S. history and by some writers
is categorized as being the second most severe, only to be outdone by the
Great Contraction of 1929-33.
The data in figure 3.3 are quite consistent with an asymmetric information
interpretation of the 1873 panic and the severe recession following. However,
it gives a prominent role to the banking panic and effects on the economy from83 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
declines in the money supply. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963) point out,
the period from 1873 to 1879 has an unusual number of years in which de-
clines in the money supply occur. These declines were probably an important
factor in the decrease in aggregate demand in this period. The resulting ex-
traordinary and prolonged deflation was then likely to have been an important
factor in the rise of asymmetric information problems because of the resulting
deterioration in firms' balance sheet positions, which further encouraged a
contraction in aggregate economic activity.
3.2.3 The Panic of 1884
We will devote somewhat less discussion to the panic of May 1884 because
it was not a particularly severe crisis. However, in figure 3.4 the patterns in
the data around the panic date are very similar to the patterns we see in other
financial crises. A recession had begun in April 1882, well before the panic,
and the interest-rate-spread variable had been declining, with the exception of
one large upward blip toward the beginning of 1884. With the decline of stock
prices after February 1884, the spread variable again begins to rise. Then, as
Sprague (1910, 110) puts it, "within little more than a week an astonishing
series of instances of fraud and defalcation, unexplained in our history, were
brought to light."
1
2 On May 8 the firm of Grant & Ward, in which the son of
Ulysses S. Grant was a major partner, failed. When audited the firm was
found to have assets of only $67,174 and liabilities of $16,792,640. The Ma-
rine National Bank, whose president, James D. Fish, was a partner in Grant
& Ward, failed immediately when it came to light that the bank had illegally
certified one of Grant & Ward's checks for $750,000. On May 13, it became
known that John C. Eno, the president of the Second National Bank, has ab-
sconded with over $3 million of the bank's securities. The next day, the Met-
ropolitan National Bank closed its doors when it was learned that its president,
George Seney, had used bank funds to speculate in railroad stocks which had
declined precipitously in value. On the morning of May 16, A. W. Dimock &
Co. failed, while in the afternoon, Fisk & Hatch (which had been able to
reopen after the panic of 1873) followed suit, taking down with it several
banks connected with the firm.
The conditions seemed ripe for a full-scale panic, and we see in panel A of
figure 3.4 the typical pattern associated with a panic of a sharp increase in
interest rates, especially for call loans, a sharp decline in stock prices (over
8% in May), and a sharp rise in the interest rate spread. However, a panic of
the 1873 magnitude was avoided by the timely action of the New York Clear-
ing House Association. On the afternoon of May 14, the New York Clearing
House met and approved the issue of clearing-house certificates to the Metro-
politan National Bank. The bank was thereby enabled to resume operations
the next day and was reorganized with a new president. In addition, the Sec-
ond National Bank was able to meet all payments because the father of the
bank's president repaid the funds stolen by his son. The net result was that the84 Frederic S. Mishkin
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Fig. 3.4 The panic of 1884
bank panic subsided and there was no general suspension of specie payments
in the banking system. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, we see the usual
pattern that interest rates decline along with the interest rate spread. We also
see a pattern that was found after the 1873 panic: the interest rate spread rose
again after the decline immediately following the panic. The continuing defla-
tion, which caused a deterioration of firms' balance sheet positions, and con-
tinuation of the recession, which increased uncertainty, help explain this rise
in the interest rate spread.
3.2.4 The Panic of 1890
The panic of 1890, like that of 1884, was only a minor crisis, in large part
because of the swift action by the Clearing House Association. In figure 3.5,85 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
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Fig. 3.5 The panic of 1890
we see the usual pattern of stock prices, interest rate spread, and interest rates
before the panic in November 1890. Interest rates begin to rise and the stock
market begins to fall several months before the panic, and at the same time
the interest rate spread begins to widen. On November 7, the Bank of England
raised its discount rate from 5% to 6%, which created concern in the New
York money market. Heavy selling in the London stock market on November
10 was followed by substantial declines in stock prices in New York, and at 2
P.M. (EST) the failure of Decker, Howell & Co. was announced, which also
involved the Bank of North America. The Clearing House Association then
immediately decided to issue clearing-house certificates, although this action
did not become known until after the close of business on the eleventh. Al-
though the next day the brokerage firm of J. C. Walcott & Co. suspended and86 Frederic S. Mishkin
the North River Bank closed, confidence was restored with the knowledge that
clearing-house certificates were being issued. When news of Baring Brothers
& Co.'s failure in London reached New York early on November 15, stocks
fell sharply. However, despite almost thirty failures of brokerage houses, a
major panic was avoided. The rise in the interest rate spread was quite small,
and by the end of November when Wall Street recognized that the Bank of
England and a syndicate of bankers were providing support to the London
money market, stock prices were recovering. The banking system weathered
the panic nicely and was able to continue full payments of specie to their
depositors. After December the commercial paper rate declined along with
the interest-rate spread. The recession, which lasted until May 1891, re-
mained a mild one.
3.2.5 The Panic of 1893
The panic of 1893, in contrast to the two previous panics of 1884 and 1890,
was a severe one. As we can see in figure 3.6, after the onset of the recession
in February 1893, interest rates rose and the stock market began to decline.
Business conditions were very unsettled, and nonfinancial business failures
were substantial. Sprague (1910) reports that the number and amount of lia-
bilities of mercantile failures from January to July 1893 were unprecedented.
In addition, the deflation that had set in at the beginning of the year was pro-
ducing a deterioration in business firms' net worth. Given the climb in interest
rates and fall in stock prices, along with uncertainty about the health of busi-
ness firms and the deterioration in firms' balance sheets, the adverse selection
and agency problems began to increase and the spread between interest rates
on high- versus low-quality borrowers began to rise, as is indicated by the
increase in the interest-rate-spread variable.
On February 26, the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad went into receiver-
ship, but more importantly, on May 4 word was received in New York of the
failure of the National Cordage Co., a stock market favorite, and a stock mar-
ket crash ensued. At this stage, the New York banks appeared to be weather-
ing the crisis. However, banks in the West and the South, which were bur-
dened with many problem loans, began to face bank runs, and in June this led
to substantial withdrawal of funds by these banks from the banks in New
York. Although the wave of bank failures was subsiding by the beginning of
July, a second wave of panic hit the western and southern banks in the third
week of July. On July 25, the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad and
the Wisconsin Marine & Fire Insurance Company suspended and there was
another sharp drop in the stock market. The bank panics in the South and
West, the resulting withdrawals by these banks from the New York banks, and
the loss of confidence in the New York banks meant that they too would suc-
cumb to the crisis, despite provisions early on by the Clearing House Associa-
tion to issue loan certificates. Finally, by the beginning of August there was a
general suspension of specie payments to bank depositors.87 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
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Fig. 3.6 The panic of 1893
The contraction of lending by the banking system as a result of its troubles
reduced its role in solving adverse selection and agency problems and clearly
made these problems worse in the financial markets. The seriousness of the
asymmetric information problems is reflected in the high values of the
interest-rate-spread variable in panel A of figure 3.6, which peaked in August
1893. Our asymmetric information analysis indicates that the events of the
1893 panic were then a major factor in the very severe economic contraction
that occurred from February 1893 to June 1894. Sobel (1963) reports that
besides the more than 600 bank failures as a result of the panic (5% of all
American banks), there were over 15,000 commercial bankruptcies, which
included such prominent railroads as the Northern Pacific, the Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe, and the New York & New England.88 Frederic S. Mishkin
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Fig. 3.7 The panic of 1896
3.2.6 The Panic of 1896
Little seems to be written about the panic of 1896, but since Gorton (1988)
includes it in his listing of bank panics, the data surrounding his date for the
panic in October 1896 is reported in figure 3.7. The data show the typical
patterns found in the other panics. Interest rates rise and stock market prices
fall several months prior to the panic date and, as our asymmetric information
story indicates, there is also a rise in the interest-rate-spread variable. After
the panic subsides, interest rates and the interest rate spread fall, while stock
prices recover. Another typical pattern is that the panic occurs after the onset
of the recession in January 1896, which ends in June 1897. Both the panic
and the recession are mild ones, and there is no suspension of specie pay-
ments, as in the panic of 1893.89 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
3.2.7 The Panic of 1907
The panic of October 1907 is one of the more severe panics to be discussed
in this paper. The traditional story about the beginning of the panic (see, e.g.,
Sprague 1910, Collman 1931, Friedman and Schwartz 1963, and Sobel 1968)
emphasizes the difficulties of a group of banks associated with businessmen
F. A. Heinze, C. F. Morse, E. R. Thomas, and O. F. Thomas, who used
them to finance their speculative activities. Their grand scheme was to estab-
lish a corner in the United Copper Company, which they owned, and to make
a killing by squeezing the short sellers. When they suffered large losses with
the collapse of the corner on Monday, October 14, the eight banks associated
with their activities came under suspicion and were forced to seek assistance
from the New York Clearing House Association during that week. By Mon-
day, October 21, the Clearing House Association appeared to have put the
affairs of these banks in order, when it was then learned that the president of
the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the third largest trust company in New
York, was involved with Morse's investment activities. The loss of confidence
in Knickerbocker Trust resulted in unfavorable clearing balances, and on the
following day, October 22, the National Bank of Commerce announced that it
would no longer continue to clear for Knickerbocker Trust. The Clearing
House Association did not extend assistance to Knickerbocker Trust, and this
is generally viewed as having been a serious mistake. The ensuing run on
Knickerbocker Trust forced the bank to close its doors on October 22. The
following day, a run began on the second largest trust company, the Trust
Company of America, and on October 24, the Lincoln Trust Company was
also subjected to a run. Although these trust companies were provided with
assistance, the steps taken were too slow and not sufficiently dramatic to re-
store confidence, as Sprague (1910) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have
noted. The stock market crashed on October 24, and the monthly return for
October 1907 was —10.9%, the thirty-first largest negative return for the
1834-1988 period documented by Wilson, Sylla, and Jones (1990). With the
assistance of J. P. Morgan, $35 million was raised by the end of the week to
assist the Trust Company of America, and the bank panic in New York seemed
to be under control. By then, however, fear had spread throughout the United
States, and country banks withdrew large amounts of funds from their New
York correspondent banks. Only when the situation was grave for the New
York banks did the Clearing House Association finally issue clearing-house
loan certificates on October 26. This action was too late because the New York
banks still suspended payments of specie to depositors, and the suspension of
specie payments then spread nationwide. Payments of specie to depositors
was not resumed until the beginning of January 1908.
The traditional story about the 1907 panic places much of the responsibility
on securities manipulation and inadequate action by the Clearing House As-
sociation to prevent a major disruption of the banking system. Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) view the substantial decline in the money supply that fol-90 Frederic S. Mishkin
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Fig. 3.8 The panic of 1907
lowed the panic to have turned a mild recession into the severe recession that
extended from June 1907 to June 1908. The data in figure 3.8 suggest that
there may be more to the story. The most striking feature of the data, as can
be seen in panel A, is the substantial increase in the interest-rate-spread vari-
able that begins in early 1907, six months before the panic. Indeed, most of
the rise in the spread variable has already occurred by the time of the October
banking panic. As shown in panel A, the banking panic apparently raised the
interest-rate-spread higher and helped prolong its high values in the first half
of 1908, but most of the rise cannot be attributed to the bank panic itself.
The rise in the spread variable before the bank panic is easily explained by
our asymmetric information story. The stock market begins to decline at the
end of 1906, and the negative return in March of — 9.8% is the fortieth largest91 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
negative return in the 1834-1988 period. Before the panic begins in October,
the stock market has declined even further, by 25% from its peak in late 1906.
As I have discussed previously, the decline in the valuation of firms by this
substantial amount raises adverse selection and agency problems for borrow-
ing firms because it has, in effect, lowered their net worth.
The onset of the recession in June 1907 before the panic, which raised un-
certainty about the quality of firms' investment projects, also increased the
adverse selection problem. In addition, the rise in the commercial paper rate
starting in June 1907, from 5.4% to 6.8% by September, further worsened the
potential for adverse selection. The resulting increases in the degree of asym-
metric information problems even before the October banking panic, should
raise the spread between interest rates for high- and low-quality borrowers,
and hence the SPREADM variable. Indeed, since most of the rise in the com-
mercial paper rate and decline in the stock market has already occurred before
the onset of the panic, not surprisingly most of the rise in the SPREADM vari-
able has already occurred. The presence of severe asymmetric information
problems, even before the banking panic, suggests that they were potentially
important factors in creating a severe business-cycle contraction. The decline
in the money supply resulting from the bank panics is almost surely another
important factor in the severity of the contraction, but the evidence here sug-
gests that it is far from being the whole story.
3.2.8 The Great Depression
The Great Depression differs significantly from other periods of financial
panic analyzed above owing to the presence of the Federal Reserve System,
which began its operations in 1914. Although the Great Depression is dated
by the NBER as beginning in September 1929, the public always associates
the onset of the Depression with the stock market crash of October 1929. The
outcome of the panic period starting October 23 and culminating in the crash
on October 29 was a negative return for the month of October of close to 20%.
This was the largest monthly negative return in the stock market up to that
time. The data in figure 3.9, however, indicate that this financial panic differed
substantially from those in previous periods.
Because of the large swing in the interest-rate-spread variable in 1929-35,
it is hard to discern its movements in the early phase of the Great Depression
shown in panel A of figure 3.9. Thus, an extra panel, panel C, has been added
to the figure to show the stock price and interest-rate-spread data for 1929—
31. In figure 3.9, C marks the October 1929 stock market crash, PI the first
banking panic of November 1930, P2 the second banking panic of March
1931, P3 Britain's departure from gold in September 1931, and PH the bank
holiday of March 1933.
As we have seen in the analysis of previous panics, the usual pattern is for
a stock market crash to be accompanied by a sharp rise in both the level of
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Fig. 3.9 The Great Depression93 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
there is some rise in the interest rate spread when the crash occurs, the in-
crease is fairly small. In addition, panel B indicates that interest rates did not
rise, the commercial paper rate held steady, while call loan rates actually fell.
Although the stock market crash had such a great impact on a whole genera-
tion, it does not appear to have developed into a full-fledged financial crisis,
as in the other episodes I have examined. The credit for this goes to the prompt
action by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide reserves to the
New York banks. During the panic period, banks and lenders outside of New
York rushed to liquidate their call loans to brokers. In order to keep market
conditions from getting more unsettled, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, as described by its president, George L. Harrison, kept its "discount
window wide open and let it be known that member banks might borrow
freely to establish the reserve required against the large increase in deposits
resulting from the taking over of loans called by others" (Friedman and
Schwartz 1963, 339). In addition, the New York Fed made open market pur-
chases of $160 million during this period, even though this amount was far in
excess of what was authorized by the Federal Reserve System's Open Market
Investment Committee.
The aftermath of the New York Fed's action to provide sufficient liquidity
for the economy was a decline of the interest rate spread to levels below those
before the stock market crash and a continuing low level up until October
1930. What is quite remarkable about the level of the interest rate spread be-
fore October 1930 is that it remained so low despite the sharp economic con-
traction up to that point and the more than 40% decline in the value of com-
mon stocks. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 306) state that, from the peak in
August 1929 through October 1930, industrial production fell 26%, whole-
sale prices by 14%, and personal income by 16%. The failure of the interest
rate spread to rise seems to indicate that asymmetric information problems
had not yet become severe in financial markets.
1
3
Just prior to the first banking panic in November-December 1930, the inter-
est rate spread began to increase and reached a temporary peak at the height
of the bank panic in December 1930. The first banking panic is described by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 308) as starting in agricultural regions, where
a "contagion of fear spread among depositors," leading to the failure of 256
banks with $180 million of deposits in November and the failure of 352 banks
with over $372 million of deposits in December, including the failure on De-
cember 11 of the Bank of United States with over $200 million in deposits.
Friedman and Schwartz viewed the nature of the economic contraction as
changing at this stage. The continuing bank panics, which by the time of the
Banking Holiday in March 1933 had reduced the number of banks by over a
third, was the unique feature of the Great Depression that Friedman and
Schwartz saw as the force behind a steep but normal recession turning into the
largest economic contraction ever experienced in U.S. history.
An asymmetric information analysis of the Great Depression, first outlined94 Frederic S. Mishkin
in Bernanke (1983), agrees with this view, but it does not see the decline in
the money supply resulting from the banking panics as being the sole cause of
the prolonged depression.
14 Instead the collapse of the banking system is seen
as preventing banks from engaging in financial intermediation activities that
would reduce asymmetric information problems. The resulting increase in
asymmetric information problems in credit markets led to a decline in invest-
ment by those with otherwise profitable investment opportunities. Further, the
debt deflation, in which the decline in prices transfers resources from debtors
to creditors, and the continuing decline in the stock market until the middle of
1932 led to a deterioration in firms' balance sheets. This increased adverse
selection and agency problems, so that lending decreased and investment then
fell. In addition, as pointed out by Mishkin (1978), a similar deterioration in
the balance sheets of consumers led them to reduce their spending. A further
effect could have come from the behavior of real interest rates in this period.
As shown in Mishkin (1981), although nominal interest rates on high-quality
bonds fell during this period, real interest rates climbed to exceedingly high
levels during 1931-33.
1
5 The high level of real interest rates increased the
adverse selection problem in credit markets and is one more reason for a de-
cline in investment spending.
All of these effects helped make the Great Depression the most severe in
U.S. history. Consistent with this story is the increase in the spread variable
to unprecedented levels. By the middle of 1932, the spread between interest
rates on corporate Baa and Treasury bonds had risen to above 7.5%, over 5
percentage points higher than the level before October 1930. Indeed, it was
not until the end of 1936 that the spread variable fell to levels below those
found before October 1930. The fact that the spread between interest rates for
low- versus high-quality borrowers remained so high for so long indicates that
asymmetric information problems were severe in this period. The continuing
severity of asymmetric information problems provides an explanation for why
the Great Depression was so prolonged.
The fact that aggregate output remained so far below its potential for such
a long period of time has always been a puzzle for neoclassical analysis. Ber-
nanke's (1983) documentation of the disruption of the credit markets during
1931-35 and the attendant asymmetric information problems provides one ex-
planation. An overlooked fact, however, is that another financial crisis ap-
pears to have occurred in 1937-38. From its peak in February 1937 until its
trough in March 1938, the stock market declined by over 50%. Indeed, four
of the fifty largest negative monthly returns from 1834 to 1988, as tabulated
by Wilson, Sylla, and Jones (1990), are found in this one-year period. And
the stock market return of -23.9% in March 1938 is the second largest neg-
ative return (September 1931 is the largest, with a return of — 29.3%). As we
can see in figure 3.10, which plots the data for 1936-41, there is another
rapid run up of the interest rate spread, which peaks in April 1938, one month
after the stock market trough. Indeed, in the first half of 1938 the interest rate
spread is back at the levels found in 1934. The large spread between interest95 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
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Fig. 3.10 The 1936-41 period
rates on low- and high-quality borrowers suggests that asymmetric informa-
tion problems were again becoming serious in 1937-38, and this helps explain
why the economic contraction during this recession was so severe.
The source of the difficulties in financial markets at this time is not abso-
lutely clear. The increase in reserve requirements in August 1936, March
1937, and May 1937 is one possibility, either through its effects on the money
supply, which declined from March 1937 until May 1938, or by decreasing
the ability of banks to extend loans because of their need to increase the ratio
of their reserves to deposits. Regardless of the cause, the financial disruption
in 1937-38 may help to explain why the U.S. economy did not really come
out of the shadow of the Depression until World War II.
There is one last episode in the 1936-41 period depicted in figure 3.10 that
deserves some comment. May 1940 had a larger decline in stock market prices96 Frederic S. Mishkin
than did October 1929. Indeed, the negative return of —22.6% in May 1940
is the third largest negative monthly return in the 1834-1988 period. Al-
though the interest rate spread rose in May and June 1940, the increase was
very temporary and its magnitude was very slight. The downward trend in the
spread variable which started after April 1938 continued after this episode,
leading to a spread below 1% by the end of World War II. This illustrates the
following important point: a stock market crash by itself does not necessarily
imply that a financial crisis has occurred. There is no evidence that there was
a serious disruption in financial markets after the May 1940 crash which could
have created difficulties for the economy.
3.2.9 An Overview of the Financial Crisis Episodes
Now that we have analyzed a whole series of financial crises, it is worth
asking what they have in common and what this tells us about the nature of
financial crises. The following facts emerge from the study of episodes in the
last half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth:
1. with one exception in 1873, financial panics always occurred after the
onset of a recession;
2. with the same exception in 1873, stock prices declined and the spread
between interest rates on low- and high-quality bonds rose before the onset
of the panic;
3. many panics seem to have features of a liquidity crisis in which there are
substantial increases in interest rates before the panic;
4. the onset of many panics followed a major failure of a financial institution,
not necessarily a bank. Furthermore, this failure was often the result of
financial difficulties experienced by a nonfinancial corporation;
5. the rise in the interest rate spread associated with a panic was typically
soon followed by a decline. However, in several cases, most notably after
the 1873 panic, the 1907 panic, and the Great Depression, the interest rate
spread increased again when there was deflation and a severe recession;
6. the most severe financial crises were associated with severe economic con-
tractions. The most severe panic episodes were in 1857, 1873, 1893,
1907, and 1930-33, while 1857-58, 1873-79, 1893-94, 1907-8, and
1929-33 are all considered to be among the most severe economic con-
tractions;
7. although stock market crashes often appear to be a major factor in creating
a financial crisis, this was not always the case. The crash of the stock
market in October 1929 and in May 1940 did not have appreciable effects
on the interest-rate spread. Therefore, the evidence that there was a serious
disruption in financial markets after these crashes is weak.
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the facts listed above.
The timing and the pattern of the data in the episodes studied here seem to fit97 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
an asymmetric information interpretation of financial crises. Rather than start-
ing with bank panics, most of the financial crises began with a rise in interest
rates, a stock market decline, and the widening of the interest rate spread.
Furthermore, a financial panic was frequently immediately preceded by a ma-
jor failure of a financial firm, which increased uncertainty in the marketplace.
The increase in uncertainty and the rise in interest rates would magnify the
adverse selection-lemons problem in the credit markets, while the decline in
the stock market increased agency and adverse selection problems, both of
which are reflected in the rise in the spread between interest rates for low- and
high-quality borrowers. The increase in adverse selection and agency prob-
lems would lead to a decline in investment activity and aggregate economic
activity.
Depositors would then want to withdraw their funds from the banking sys-
tem because the poor business conditions would lead them to expect losses on
deposits left in the banks. The resulting bank panic would raise interest rates
further, cause the stock market to decline even more, and worsen agency and
adverse selection problems in the credit markets. This would further encour-
age a severe economic contraction.
Finally, there would be a sorting of solvent from insolvent firms by bank-
ruptcy proceedings and a sorting of solvent from insolvent banks, often with
the help of public authorities and clearing-house associations. The panic
would then subside, the stock market might undergo a recovery, interest rates
would fall, and if economic uncertainty and deflation were not too severe,
adverse selection and agency problems would diminish, leading to a decline
in the interest-rate-spread variable and setting the stage for an eventual recov-
ery of the economy. This process might get short circuited if a substantial
deflation sets in, leading to a debt-deflation process which transfers resources
from debtors to creditors, thereby leading to a deterioration in business firms'
net worth. The deterioration of firms' balance sheet positions would lead to
increased asymmetric information problems, reflected by a continuation of a
large spread between interest rates for low- and high-quality borrowers. In-
vestment spending and aggregate economic activity would then remain de-
pressed for a prolonged period of time.
A monetarist interpretation of financial panics cannot explain the events and
their timing as effectively as the asymmetric information approach because
the monetarist view does not explain why the spread between interest rates for
high- and low-quality borrowers rises dramatically before the panic and then
declines after the panic subsides. However, the asymmetric information story
does not rule out important effects on aggregate economic activity from the
decline in the money supply that a banking panic produces. It just suggests
that there is more to the story of a financial crisis than its effects on the money
supply.
A monetarist explanation of financial panics is also not able to explain why
the banking panics occurred when they did. The facts about the panic episodes
discussed in this paper are entirely consistent with Gorton's (1988) view that98 Frederic S. Mishkin
bank panics are predictable. His analysis depends on asymmetric information
because he sees a bank panic as occurring as a result of the inability of depos-
itors to evaluate the risk in individual bank liabilities, so they cannot easily
screen out good from bad banks. Hence, when information such as high inter-
est rates, a major failure of a corporation, or weak business conditions stem-
ming from a recession occurs, depositors worry about potential losses on their
deposits and withdraw funds from the banking system, precipitating a panic.
Gorton finds that unanticipated changes in the liabilities of failed businesses
in the best predictive variable for the occurrence of a bank panic. The analysis
in this paper suggests that since stock market declines and widening of the
interest rate spread often precede bank panics, stock price and interest-rate-
spread variables, which were not used in Gorton's analysis, might also appre-
ciably help in the prediction of bank panics.
The successful intervention of the New York Clearing House Association
in the 1884 and 1890 episodes and of the New York Federal Reserve Bank
during the October 1929 stock market crash illustrates how an effective
lender-of-last-resort role can minimize the impact of a financial crisis on the
economy. We now turn to two postwar episodes of financial disturbances in
which the Federal Reserve actively performed this role, even though the bank-
ing system was not directly threatened.
3.3 Two Postwar Episodes of Financial Disturbances
The postwar period differs from the pre-World War II period in one impor-
tant respect. Since 1945, the banking system has not been subjected to a bank-
ing panic and in no instance has there been a financial crisis that has had
serious adverse consequences for the aggregate economy. Examining episodes
of financial disturbances in the postwar period in which banking panics were
not an issue should be particularly instructive because the monetarist interpre-
tation does not view them as real financial crises. However, if we do find that
these financial disturbances have many of the same patterns in the data as
prewar financial crises, and thus appear to exhibit the potential for serious
asymmetric information problems in credit markets, this would lend addi-
tional support to the asymmetric information approach to financial crises. Two
episodes, the Penn Central bankruptcy of June 1970 and the stock market
crash of 19 October 1987, are postwar examples of financial disturbances in
which banking panics were not an issue. In both episodes the Federal Reserve
actively provided liquidity to a specific financial sector outside of the banking
system and thus engaged in a broader lender-of-last-resort role.
3.3.1 The Penn Central Bankruptcy
Prior to 1970, commercial paper was considered one of the safest money
market instruments because only corporations with very high credit ratings
issued it. It was common practice for corporations to continually roll over99 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
their commercial paper, that is, issue new commercial paper to pay off the old.
Penn Central Railroad was a major issuer of commercial paper, with more
than $200 million outstanding, but by May 1970 it was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy and it requested federal government assistance from the Nixon admin-
istration.
1
6 Despite administration support for a bailout of Penn Central, after
six weeks of debate Congress decided not to pass bailout legislation. Mean-
while, the Nixon administration asked the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to authorize a direct loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to Penn Central. On Thursday, June 18, the New York Fed informed
the Board of Governors that its staff studies indicated that Penn Central would
not be able to repay the loan and, as a result, the Board decided not to autho-
rize the loan. Without this loan, Penn Central was forced to declare bank-
ruptcy on Sunday, 21 June 1970.
Once the Federal Reserve made the decision to let Penn Central go into
bankruptcy, it was concerned that Penn Central's default on its commercial
paper would, as Brimmer (1989, 6) puts it, have a "chilling effect on the com-
mercial paper market", making it impossible for other corporations to roll
over their commercial paper. The Penn Central bankruptcy, then, had the po-
tential for sending other companies into bankruptcy which, in turn, might
have triggered further bankruptcies, leading to a full-scale financial panic. To
avoid this scenario, the New York Fed got in touch with a number of large
money-center banks on Saturday and Sunday, June 20 and 21, alerted them to
the impending Penn Central bankruptcy, encouraged them to lend to their cus-
tomers who were unable to roll over their commercial paper, and indicated
that the discount window would be made available to the banks so that they
could make these loans.
1
7 Indeed, the banks did as they were told and made
these loans, receiving as much as $575 million through the discount window
for this purpose. In addition, on June 22 the Fed decided to suspend Regula-
tion Q ceilings on deposits of $100,000 and over, in order to keep short-term
interest rates from rising, and the formal vote was taken the next day to allow
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board to take parallel action. The net result was that the Federal Reserve pro-
vided liquidity so that the commercial paper market would keep functioning.
The rationale for the Fed's action was that lenders would not be able to
screen out good borrowers in this market from bad borrowers. Was this ratio-
nale plausible? The data in figure 3.11 are suggestive that it was. Panel A has
the same format as previous figures, with the onset of the recession in January
1970 marked with an R, the Penn Central bankruptcy date marked by a P, and
data on the stock market and the SPREADB interest-rate-spread variable. Panel
B contains data on the commercial paper rate and on the interest rate spread
between commercial paper (4-6 month) and the 6-month Treasury bill, de-
noted by SPREADC (replacing the rate on call loans, which were no longer a
major element in money markets).
The data in panel A display the typical pattern that we saw for prewar finan-100 Frederic S. Mishkin
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Fig. 3.11 The Penn Central bankruptcy
cial crises. The high level of interest rates reached in late 1969-early 1970,
and the increase in uncertainty with the onset of the recession in January 1970
are likely to have increased the adverse selection problem in the credit mar-
kets. Furthermore, by May 1970 the stock market had declined over 35%
from its peak value in November 1969. This decline in the valuation of firms
resulted in a decrease in net worth and increased agency and adverse selection
problems in the credit markets. Consistent with the rise in asymmetric infor-
mation difficulties for the credit markets, there is a rise in both of the interest-
rate-spread variables, SPREADB (for long-term bonds) and SPREADC (for com-
mercial paper). Furthermore, despite the Fed's actions, there is also a jump in
the interest-rate-spread variables at the time of the Penn Central bankruptcy in101 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
June 1970. The fact that the spread between interest rates on corporate Baa
and Treasury bonds rises along with the commercial paper-Treasury spread
variable indicates that the problems in the commercial paper market had a
potential for spreading to other sectors of the capital market. As we saw after
other financial disturbances, the interest-rate spread declines after the crisis,
and this pattern is especially pronounced for the commercial paper-Treasury
spread variable in panel B, which returns to 1968 levels by the end of 1970.
The SPREADB variable, on the other hand, continues to remain high for over
two years after the Penn Central bankruptcy. However, the increase in the
SPREADB variable resulting from the Penn Central bankruptcy was not large by
the standards of earlier financial crises. A major disturbance to the credit mar-
kets as a result of increased asymmetric information problems seems to have
been avoided by the Fed's willingness to perform its lender-of-last-resort
function.
3.3.2 The Stock Market Crash of 19 October 1987
The causes of the stock market crash are still being hotly debated, but the
biggest danger to the economy appears not to have come from the decline in
wealth resulting from the crash itself, but rather from the threat to the clearing
and settlement system in the stock and futures markets.
1
8 From the peak on 25
August 1987 until October 16, just prior to the crash, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA) had declined 17.5%. On Monday, October 19, the market fell
by 22.6% (as measured by the DJIA) on record volume of 604 million shares.
Although 19 October 1987, dubbed "Black Monday," will go down in history
as the largest one-day decline in stock prices to date, it was on Tuesday, Oc-
tober 20, that financial markets received their worst threat. In order to keep
the stock market and the related index futures market functioning in an orderly
fashion, brokers needed to extend massive amounts of credit on behalf of their
customers for their margin calls. The magnitude of the problem is illustrated
by the fact that two brokerage firms, Kidder, Peabody and Goldman, Sachs,
alone had advanced $1.5 billion in response to margin calls on their customers
by noon of October 20. Clearly, brokerage firms as well as specialists were
severely in need of additional funds to finance their activities. However,
understandably enough, banks were growing very nervous about the financial
health of securities firms and so were reluctant to lend to the securities indus-
try at a time when it was most needed.
Upon learning of the plight of the securities industry, Alan Greenspan,
chairman of the Board of Governors, and E. Gerald Corrigan, president of the
New York Federal Reserve Bank and the Fed official most closely in touch
with Wall Street, began to fear a breakdown in the clearing and settlement
systems and the collapse of securities firms. To prevent this from occurring,
Alan Greenspan announced before the market opened on Tuesday, October
20, the Federal Reserve System's "readiness to serve as a source of liquidity102 Frederic S. Mishkin
to support the economic and financial system." In addition to this extraordi-
nary announcement, the Fed encouraged key money-center banks to lend
freely to their brokerage firm customers and, as in the Penn Central bank-
ruptcy episode, made it clear that it would provide discount loans to banks so
that they could make these loans. Again, the banks did as they were told, and
by October 21 had increased by $7.7 billion their loans to brokers and to
individuals to purchase or hold securities. As a result, the markets kept func-
tioning on Tuesday, October 20, and a market rally ensued that day, raising
the DJIA by over 100 points (over 5%). This action by the Fed is reminiscent
of the actions it took in the October 1929 panic period, during which it pro-
vided liquidity to enable money-center banks to take over call loans which
had been called by others.
The data for the period surrounding the October stock market crash are
found in figure 3.12. Panels A and B have the same format as those in figure
3.11, while an additional panel, panel C, is shown which contains weekly
data on interest spread variables for the six months surrounding the crash.
Panel C also plots a series obtained from weekly issues of Barrons, the spread
between interest rates on junk bonds (those with ratings below Baa) and Trea-
sury bonds, denoted by SPREADJ.
The data in figure 3.12 again display patterns seen in other financial crises.
The commercial paper rate had been rising for a year before the stock market
crash because of the tight money policy followed by the Fed, while stock
prices began a decline over a month earlier. The evidence for increased asym-
metric information problems in credit markets before the crash, however, is
not particularly strong. The commercial paper-Treasury bill interest-rate-
spread variable, SPREADC, also had been rising for a year before the crash, and
yet the junk bond-Treasury and Baa-Treasury spread variables, SPREADJ and
SPREADB, did not rise until the stock market crash, when they immediately
jumped. Not surprisingly, given that asymmetric information effects should
have more effect on low-quality borrowers than on high-quality borrowers,
the junk bond-Treasury spread shows the largest jump. In the week of the
stock market crash, it jumped by 130 basis points (1.3 percentage points) and
rose another 60 basis points over the next two weeks. However, as usually
occurs after a panic, the junk bond-Treasury spread fell quickly thereafter,
and within two months of the crash was back to pre-crash levels. The com-
mercial paper-Treasury spread, SPREADC, followed a similar pattern by return-
ing quickly to its pre-cash levels, but the Baa-Treasury spread, SPREADB, de-
clined more slowly and only reached its pre-crash level six months after the
crash.
The fact that the spread variables seem to fit a classic pattern for financial
crises suggests that the October 1987 stock market crash had the potential to
create major asymmetric information problems in the credit markets. How-
ever, the prompt action by the Fed to perform its lender-of-last-resort role kept
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by the moderate increase in the Baa-Treasury spread relative to earlier finan-
cial panics. The failure to enter a recession after the stock market crash, de-
spite many forecasters' predictions along these lines, is consistent with the
view that the Fed's actions prevented the development of serious asymmetric
information problems in the credit markets.
3.3.3 An Overview of the Postwar Episodes
The key fact that emerges from the postwar episodes analyzed here is that
they display the typical timing patterns visible in the data for the prewar finan-
cial crises, although with a much-muted amplitude. This fact suggests that
these episodes had the potential to create a major disturbance to the credit
markets by substantially increasing asymmetric information problems.
Furthermore, the small magnitude of the effects on the interest-rate-spread
variables suggests that the quick and decisive action by the Federal Reserve to
perform as lender-of-last resort prevented more serious asymmetric informa-
tion disturbances to the credit markets which could have had significant ad-
verse consequences for the aggregate economy.
3.4 Conclusions
The asymmetric information approach to financial crises explains the tim-
ing patterns in the data and many features of these crises which are otherwise
hard to explain. It also suggests why financial crises have had such important
consequences for the aggregate economy over the past one hundred and fifty
years. The evidence thus seems to favor as asymmetric information view of
financial crises over a monetarist view.
However, the asymmetric information approach can be viewed as comple-
mentary to the monetarist view of financial crises since it provides an impor-
tant transmission mechanism for how banking panics and monetary distur-
bances affect aggregate economic activity. Yet, the asymmetric information
approach does not view banking panics and money supply declines as the only
financial disturbances that can have serious adverse effects on the aggregate
economy. Financial crises have effects over and above those resulting from
banking panics, and analysis of such episodes as the stock market collapse in
1937-38 suggests that a financial crisis which has serious adverse conse-
quences for the economy can develop, even if there is no threat to the banking
system. The asymmetric information approach also suggests that financial
disturbances outside of the banking system in the postwar period have had the
potential to have serious adverse effects on the aggregate economy.
The analysis in this paper suggests that there could be benefits to a lender-
of-last-resort role for the central bank to provide liquidity to nonbanking sec-
tors of the financial system in which asymmetric information problems have
developed. However, there are also potential costs to such an expanded
lender-of-last-resort role since it might encourage too much risk-taking on the105 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
part of nonfinancial corporations. There are thus complex issues involved in
deciding whether an expanded lender-of-last-resort role will, on the whole,
be beneficial and how it should be executed. This is a topic that I plan to
pursue in further research.
Notes
1. The lemons problem also can be important in equity markets. Myers and Majluf
(1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) describe how the inability of inves-
tors to distinguish between good and bad issuers of equity means that the price they
will pay for shares will reflect the average quality of the issuers. The result is that high-
quality firms receive a lower price for their shares than the fair market value, while
low-quality firms receive a price above the fair market value. As a result, some high-
quality firms will not issue shares, and thus investment projects with a positive net
present value will not be undertaken.
2. Asymmetric information can also explain credit rationing in which there are re-
strictions on the size of loans, as in Jaffee and Russell (1976).
3. F. Ross Johnson, the former CEO of RJR-Nabisco, is reputed to have had RJR-
Nabisco pay for two personal maids, two dozen country club memberships, and a fleet
often corporate planes nicknamed the "RJR Airforce."
4. Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) emphasize this mechanism in their econometric
analysis of the 1894-1909 period.
5. In addition, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), banks have an advantage
in minimizing moral hazard on the part of borrowers because banks can use the threat
of cutting off lending in the future to improve borrowers' behavior.
6. Credit controls, such as those imposed in 1980, or disintermediation arising out
of deposit rate ceilings are another possible way in which banks may find themselves
unable to fully perform their intermediation role.
7. Note that the dates at which the number of bonds in each category changes do not
fall within any of the subsamples analyzed in the paper. This avoids the potential for
discontinuities in the interest-rate-spread series during the episodes studied.
8. The stock price series developed by Schwert (1989b) is very close to that of
Wilson, Sylla, and Jones (1990), and its use would not change any conclusions in the
analysis here.
9. The financial crisis associated with the beginning of World War I in August 1914
is not examined in this paper because data are not available from August to November
1914, when the New York Stock Exchange was closed.
10. Another important role of the clearing-house associations mentioned by Gorton
(1985) is that they would provide liquidity to the banking system by issuing clearing-
house certificates during a panic. The clearing-house associations had not yet taken on
this role in 1857, but did so in later banking panics.
11. A similar phenomenon can also affect consumer spending, as discussed in
Mishkin(1978).
12. For those who, like myself, do not know the meaning of the word "defalcation,"
it is a misappropriation of funds held by a trustee or other fiduciary.
13. The failure of the interest rate spread to rise also casts some doubt on the story
put forward by Romer (1988) that the initial severity of the Great Depression may have
resulted from increased uncertainty. Since such uncertainty should increase adverse
selection and thereby increase the interest rate spread, and yet this does not seem to106 Frederic S. Mishkin
happen before October 1930, it is not at all clear that uncertainty rose appreciably in
this period.
14. See also Hamilton (1987).
15. Hamilton (1987) disputes the view that real interest rates were high during this
period because he finds that futures prices in commodity markets were not indicating
an expected deflation in this period. Mishkin (1990), however, demonstrates that fu-
tures prices in commodity markets are not capable of informing us about expected
inflation for aggregate price indices. Cecchetti (1989), using additional evidence, also
criticizes Hamilton's position that the deflation in this period was not anticipated. More
recent work by Hamilton (1990) is more favorable to the view that real interest rates
rose during the 1931-33 period. Indeed, an interesting finding in the Hamilton paper is
that substantial anticipated deflation, and hence high real rates, did not occur until late
1930, and this is exactly when we start to see evidence that serious asymmetric infor-
mation problems are beginning to appear in the U.S. economy.
16. See Maisel (1973) and Brimmer (1989) for further discussion of the Penn Cen-
tral bankruptcy episode.
17. It is noteworthy that when the Fed advanced discount loans to banks lending to
customers who needed to roll over their commercial paper, the banks were told that
they would be responsible for the credit risk involved in this lending; see Brimmer
(1989, 6).
18. See the Wall Street Journal (1987) and Brimmer (1989) for a description of the
events surrounding the stock market crash.
References
Akerlof, George. 1970. The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August): 488-500.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1983. Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propaga-
tion of the Great Depression. American Economic Review 73 (June): 257-76.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler. 1989. Agency Costs, Collateral, and Business
Fluctuations. American Economic Review 79 (March): 14-31.
. 1990. Financial Fragility and Economic Performance. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 55 (February): 87—114.
Bordo, Michael D. 1986. Financial Crises, Banking Crises, Stock Market Crashes and
the Money Supply: Some International Evidence, 1870-1933. In Financial Crises
and the World Banking System, ed. F. Capie and G. E. Wood, 190-248. London:
Macmillan.
Brimmer, Andrew F. 1989. Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Cen-
tral Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 3 (Spring): 3-16.
Calomiris, Charles W., and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1989. Price Flexibility, Credit Availa-
bility, and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from the United States, 1894-1909.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 54 (August): 429-52.
. 1990. Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, and "Credit Rationing." Eco-
nomic Journal 100 (March): 90-104.
Cecchetti, Steven. 1989. Prices During the Great Depression: Was the Deflation of
1930-32 Really Unanticipated? National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper no. 3174 (November).107 Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises
Collman, Charles Albert. 1931. Our Mysterious Panics. New York: William Morrow
&Co.
Diamond, Douglas. 1984. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Re-
view of Economic Studies 51 (July): 393-414.
Fisher, Irving. 1933. The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. Econometrica
1 (October): 337-57.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gertler, Mark. 1988a. Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An
Overview. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20 (August, 2): 559-88.
. 1988b. Financial Capacity, Reliquification, and Production in an Economy
with Long-Term Financial Arrangements. University of Wisconsin, mimeo (Octo-
ber).
Gorton, Gary. 1985. Clearing Houses and the Origins of Central Banking in the U.S.
Journal of Economic History 45: 277-84.
. 1988. Banking Panics and Business Cycles. Oxford Economic Papers 40:
751-81.
Greenwald, Bruce, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1988. Information, Finance Constraints,
and Business Fluctuations. In Expectations and Macroeconomics, ed. Meir Kahn
and S. C. Tsiang. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greenwald, Bruce, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss. 1984. Information Imper-
fections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. American Eco-
nomic Review 74 (May): 194-99.
Hamilton, James. 1987. Monetary Factors in the Great Depression. Journal of Mone-
tary Economics 19 (March): 145-70.
. 1990. Was the Deflation During the Great Depression Anticipated? Evidence
from the Commodity Futures Market. University of Virginia, mimeo (March 23).
Jaffee, Dwight, and Thomas Russell. 1976. Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and
Credit Rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (November) :651-66.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1978. Manias, Panics and Crashes. London: Macmillan.
Macaulay, Frederick R. 1938. The Movements of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock
Prices in the United States Since 1856. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Maisel, Sherman J. 1973. Managing the Dollar. New York: Norton.
Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1986. The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 101 (August): 455-70.
Minsky, Hyman P. 1972. Financial Stability Revisited: The Economics of Disaster. In
Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism, vol. 3: 95-136. Washing-
ton, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1978. The Household Balance Sheet and the Great Depression.
Journal of Economic History 38 (December): 918-37.
. 1981. The Real Rate of Interest: An Empirical Investigation. In The Cost and
Consequences of Inflation. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
no. 15: 151-200.
. 1990. Can Futures Market Data Be Used to Understand the Behavior of Real
Interest Rates. Journal of Finance 45 (March): 245-57.
Myers, Stewart C, and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment De-
cisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 13 (June): 187-221.
Romer, Christina. 1988. The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression. Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 2639 (June).
Schwartz, Anna J. 1986. Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises. In Financial Crises and108 Frederic S. Mishkin
the World Banking System, ed. F. Capie and G. E. Wood, 11-31. London: Mac-
millan.
Schwert, G. William. 1989a. Business Cycles, Financial Crises and Stock Volatility.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 2957 (May).
. 1989b. Indexes of United States Stock Prices From 1802 to 1987. National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 2985 (May).
Smith, Walter B., and Arthur H. Cole. 1935. Fluctuations in American Business
1790-1860. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Sobel, Robert. 1968. Panic on Wall Street: A History of America's Financial Disasters.
London: Macmillan.
Sprague, O. M. W. 1910. History of Crises under the National Banking System.
Washington, DC: National Monetary Commission, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice.
Stiglitz, Joseph, and Andrew Weiss. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information. American Economic Review 71 (June): 393-410.
. 1983. Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to Credit and Labor
Markets. American Economic Review 73 (December): 912-27.
Temin, Peter. 1976. Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? New York:
W. W. Norton.
Wall Street Journal. 1987. Terrible Tuesday: How the Stock Market Almost Disinte-
grated a Day After the Crash. November 20.
Wilson, Jack, Richard Sylla, and Charles P. Jones. 1990. Financial Market Volatility,
Panics Under the National Banking System Before 1914, and Volatility in the Long
Run, 1830-1988. In Crashes and Panics: A Historical Perspective, ed. Eugene N.
White. Dow Jones/Irwin: Homewood.